Abstract
Introduction
Storage area networks meet a number of IT managers' needs in that they provide a flexible and manageable storage infrastructure. They are designed to support hundreds to thousands of devices providing high performance, backup, and high availability and as such provide a powerful storage infrastructure for business critical functions. This means that SAN systems will hold large amounts of business critical data that in turn have some severe security requirements. There is also a trend of relying on contractors, outsourced system managers and even hosting systems in third party data centres leading to a loss of direct control on the data and as such increased care should be taken with protecting data against internal and external attacks as well as accidental leaks.
SAN networks connect every computer to every storage device bringing obvious security concerns. Host based security constrains the configuration of each server to talk to particular disks with in the SAN system; it requires a positive granting of permissions, although this has the disadvantage that new or unconfigured hosts are not secured. More typically, fabric level security is used [4] [15] to divide disks into zones or uses LUNs on large RAID systems and then relies on the SAN switching fabric to separate these zones. This can be done either using soft zoning (based on a name server) or hard zoning in the switches. Security can also be provided at the storage device level where machines have to be granted access to each storage device.
These security techniques provide a broad segregation of data at the device level stopping unauthorised access to the data. Three main problems exist; firstly, the administrators can reconfigure the SAN system such that a malicious insider could add extra machines and gain unauthorised data access. Secondly, the data is not encrypted over the fibre between the disks and servers this opens up possibilities of data leaking or being inserted. Finally, the data remains unencrypted on the disks within a data centre, and on associated backups leaving potential for leakage.
This paper explores the issues described above and how an encryption and strong key management scheme can help tighten security in a SAN system. The approach taken in this paper is to concentrate on key management and ensuring that encryption keys are tightly controlledthereby tightly controlling access to the data -or strongly auditing who accesses or changes access to the data. The approach is based on having a set of hardware security appliances (HSA) that like an HSM protects keys but also contains processes that control key usage such as policy [11] enforcement. The use of a set of hardware security devices ensures the encryption keys can be strongly managed thereby enforcing separation of data. This paper describes the HSA approach of keeping key services within secure hardware thereby enhancing system or application level security. The approach is applied to SAN networks to provide encryption, strong key management and audit of administrator actions hence enhancing SAN security.
Encrypting the data
SAN security has a number of important issues with much of the security effort being concerned with separating access to disks or logical units and thereby segregating access to the data. Zoning or LUN masking provide a degree of protection stopping the data leaking between machines but this does not stop administrators reconfiguring systems to gain access to data nor does it provide security as data is passed over the SAN infrastructure. This paper proposes that the data is encrypted at the host bus adaptor (HBA) and remains encrypted throughout the SAN communication fabric and on the storage devices. Encryption can help prevent accidental or malicious disclosure where disk access is gained and ensures that the data is encrypted during its transit in the SAN.
To say that the data is secure because it is encrypted is naive in that this pushes the problem of securing the data to ensuring the bytes (now encrypted bytes) cannot be read and more importantly ensuring that keys to decrypt or re-encrypt are only accessible in an authorised context. As such, this paper mainly concentrates on securely managing the distribution and use of encryption keys to the HBA rather than the actual encryption. However, part of the key management strategy is to use different keys for each block thereby minimising the consequences of a lost key and reducing the effects of plain text attacks. The following section describes a general approach of using a HSA to secure access to pieces of data -section 4 then shows how this approach can be used in securing key distribution and usage within an encrypted SAN system. The use of such a key management scheme allows encryption within SANs to enforce a level of segregation as well as providing a strong audit point and the enabling a tighter integration with other security mechanisms.
Hardware Security Appliances
Computer and storage systems are growing in both functionality and complexity and as a result, it is becoming harder to gain full understanding and secure them. The number of bugs will no doubt increase with the complexity of the software and additionally it is increasingly difficult to correctly configure such complex systems. These factors can lead to significant vulnerabilities and potential security holes -often still to be discovered. SAN security relies on the correctness of the management systems, switches (including the switch software) and on the configuration software for zoning or LUN masking. The most vulnerable part is probably the management system and the systems on which it runs enabling access to management ports of the switch.
There are three typical approaches to securing these management systems: firstly, to build a fortress around the system; secondly, building the management system on a secure operating system and thirdly to look at key security parts of the management system and ensure they are within a trusted computing base. All the approaches are complementary, the first approach aims to stop hackers and unauthorised users accessing the system; the second and third both try to limit the actions that users (authorised or not) can take once in the system. This paper concentrates on the use of hardware security appliances that act as a trusted computing base, i.e. it provides a secure environment for running key portions of the management application -in this case key management and policy enforcement.
Traditionally a hardware security module HSM can be used to protect keys from exposure to an outside system protecting their generation, storage and usage -however HSMs often perform simple cryptographic operations [9] rather than securing usage of the keys. In using a more powerful HSA system that can run code as well as looking after keys and performing cryptographic operations certain applications such as those related to storage and management can be more tightly controlled.
The HSA could be thought of as a secure co-processor that contains a general processor, memory, and clock; along with cryptographic functionality all protected by a physical wrapper, that actively protects the keys, other secrets and their role within the application. Smith et al [12] have described some work concerning using a secure co-processor to run applications [13, 8] thereby providing strong security guarantees. The HSA approach described here is concerned with using such trusted hardware as an appliance that can run simple services that support and provide strong application security properties. Some applications contain key combinations of operations which when made atomic bring strong security properties to the outcome. The HSA provides a platform on which a very simple service (or application component) can be run; where certain 'guarantees' are made about the security of the system and hardware. The underlying platform must be as simple as possible to reduce the likelihood of bugs and leaky configurations -ideally; the hardware design would use cryptographic processors that only decrypt keys within protected registers. Services (or components) can then be loaded such that they rely on these platform 'guarantees' to make strong statements about the security of the application. Attention is needed to ensure the loading process can be "trusted" and to allow sharing of keys and secrets with other interested parties (such as further HSA based applications).
The generic abstract way that HSA's can be used to add security is shown in figure 1 . To achieve this, the standard infrastructure has not simply been augmented with the HSA. The application is designed to allow the security critical components to be run within the HSA. For many applications, (especially legacy) it may not be possible to architect so that the critical processes can be run within HSA's. However, both in order to convince the reader that the approach has merit beyond the particular SAN applications described here and also to explain the approach further we now provide a specific example for document storage. 
An HSA in a Secure Document Store
Initially this approach was motivated by a trusted storage problem [1, 2] where a third party service would be designed to robustly store and manage documents. The HSA approach was used to try to minimise the operational liabilities on the third party and reduce the risk that they would accidentally disclose data or that administrators would be able to access the data. To ensure confidentiality each document is encrypted. There were many security issues relating to the integrity and accessibility of the documents. In this example, we restrict ourselves with the key management problem relating to encryption, and to ensuring the correct access control policies are enforced before decryption.
A typical security design for this problem would use a HSM to ensure that the keys used remain secret and perhaps to securely perform the decryption processes. However, the fetching of the appropriate access policy, the parsing and enforcement of the policy would be done within a normal process of an ordinary server running a common OS. Even with a carefully designed infrastructure, this process is vulnerable to network or malicious administrator attacks.
The HSA approach is to expand the HSM to be able to run the extra-identified processes. The service encapsulates secret (key) keeping with policy enforcement (ESKAPE service). One trick applied is to use a private key within the HSA to bind (by signing) the access policy to a document (as specified by the user storing the document). This allows the HSA to subsequently verify the binding without holding any state about the document or the policy. Minimising the state held by an HSA service is an important constraint in keeping the hardware simple. Figure 2 shows the basic protocol for encrypting a document, the access policy and document are presented to the ESKAPE service, which binds them by signing a hash of both, and returning the enveloped document. Ideally, the user wishing to add a document into the storage system would encrypt it along with a storage agreement using the public key of the eskape service. The eskape service will then repackage, extracting the storage agreement and access policies, linking these to the document that is re-encrypted and packaged for management within the storage service. Once encrypted the data can safely be held and replicated in as many places as possible. The only way to decrypt the document is to present it along with the requestors credentials proving their right to view it, back to the ESKAPE service (or a clone holding the same secrets) and to demonstrate that the policy conditions are met, see figure 3 1 . The ESKAPE service and its secrets can be securely loaded by a 3 rd party independent of the storage service provider, and once this is done even the administrators of the storage service cannot edit the policies or access the keys or the data
Managing keys in a SAN environment
A main assumption in this paper is that encryption is important for achieving many of the security aims described in the introduction. It is also assumed that the real problem when encrypting data, especially where multiple parties are involved, is key management. Section 3 showed how the HSA approach significantly simplifies key management at one level of abstraction (i.e. document storage). This section shows how the HSA approach can be used to manage keys in a SAN environment.
The ESKAPE service combined key management with encryption and decryption processes. This was fine for the relatively sedate pace of document management; however SANs have more performance concerns. It seems better to perform the (symmetric) encryption and decryption at an appropriate point in the data flow, i.e. the host bus adaptor (HBA). Conversely managing the keys, which of course 1 For the ESKAPE service to make judgments about credentials presented it keeps a list of trusted 3 rd parties (public keys) that it will trust to have cross signed credentials. For extra security it is also possible for the service to re-envelope the document for the specified receiver.
equates to managing access to the data, can usefully be encapsulated away from the hosts, switches and data. Moreover, this encapsulation (management) point becomes an ideal portal from which to strongly audit key requests and policy changes. Thus, the encrypted SAN system described has two different services deployed using HSA technology. In theory both services can be relied upon to keep the keys secret leaving the main security consequence of having two services being to ensure that the keys are securely communicated between the HSAs. Figure 4 shows the SAN system augmented with HSA's (drawn as padlocks). The host bus adaptors have been modified to include a trusted component that acts as an encryption HSA this combination provides a secured host bus adaptor (SHBA). This HSA carries out key handling, encryption and decryption of data being read and written to the SAN. The keys are controlled and down loaded from the key manager service. This key manager service also runs in a HSA and provides a strong enforcement point for managing access to data -it controls access to the base encryption keys and therefore access to the data. The encryption keys are generated and managed by the key manager service. This service is configured with a set of policies controlling which SHBAs should get which keys, and with which access policies (e.g. a key could be for read-only). The service distributes keys, in a secure manner, to the various SHBAs that enforce read and write policy by only using the key appropriately. Encrypting various domains of data with separate keys will produce some form of data segregation as long as the encryption keys are tightly controlled. Using HSA's both for managing and using the keys means that they are never in an unprotected part of the system and should not be subject to physical or logical leaks.
As has been emphasised the main problem to address is key management, however the key management problem can only properly be discussed in the context of a particular encryption scheme. Thus, the encryption scheme and how it addresses segregation of data and longterm security is described next. The main part of this section describes the key management processes and the role played by the HSA's and services. The final issue concerns the functionality and form of the HSA devices including ensuring they have the necessary security and resilience properties.
Encryption
SAN security would normally segment data at a coarse level, encrypting the data as proposed can strengthen this segmentation. The encryption scheme described below uses different keys for each disk block based on a common secret for a coarse segment such as a LUN or zone. Possible segmentations depend on the basic addressing mechanism for example HPUX fibre channel addressing allows addressing of FC area, port, target device and LUN and some combination of these factors could be used to derive the segment keys.
The encryption keys used are not session keys and the encrypted data is likely to remain on disk for considerable periods; therefore, these keys should be carefully controlled and the effects of leaks minimised. Storing unique keys for each disk block would create large numbers of keys and it becomes hard to identify the appropriate key for the block -also larger sets of data become harder to keep secret. Conversely using a single key for the entire segment would allow an analysis where common bits of data could be discovered. Instead, a key generation schedule is used based on a segment secret that is modified using the disk block address. Ideally, this modification is based on a hash function so it becomes hard to trace back to the original secret even if the key for several of the disk blocks becomes broken.
Block Key = Hash( Segment_secret, Block address).
The basic unit of data that must be fetched will depend on the particular encryption algorithm. AES [ref] (which has a fast key set up phase) [3] would mean data would be read in 128 bit blocks. Structure could be added within a disk block to either use an encryption mode to avoid statistical attacks. Possible encryption modes [6] will depend on the granularity of the block reads from the device although an encryption mode base on xoring the plain text with a value generated from the position within the block could be used.
The key manager empowers a SHBA to read data from a LUN, by providing it with the secret associated with that LUN or zone. The SHBA can derive the key for a particular disk block by combining the secret (for the LUN or zone) with the disk block address. This can be performed whilst the data is being fetched. Writes to data will take a similar process where the key is initially set up and data is encrypted by passing it through the SHBA. A simple key cache within the HSA on the host bus adaptor could speed things up where many accesses are made to similar blocks.
Key Management
The section above describes a mechanism for mapping from disk addresses into suitable encryption keys based on a secret for a particular zone or LUN. Following the HSA philosophy, both the mapping process and the de/encryption are carried out within the service. This ensures that the secret is never exposed outside of the protected hardware. This section addresses the problem of managing the distribution of these secrets, ensuring that the distribution is compliant to management policies and that the system is tightly audited. This combination of policy enforcement and auditing ensures that there are no simple backdoors available to the administrator and if the administrator were to reconfigure the storage system to gain access to data, their actions would be recorded.
The Basic Key Management Service
The key manager service is a separate service that is outside of the control of the SAN systems. It runs within a HSA ensuring that its functionality is not compromised. Users reliant on the storage system can check the details of the HSA being used as well as the key manager functionality thereby assuring themselves that their policies will be correctly enforced. These policies could range from a simple list of machines allowed in a particular zone to more complex policies specifying a range of machines and the authorisation requirements required to specify which machines can access the zone at any single point.
Normal Operations
Once configured the normal operation of the key manager service is to pass the secrets associated with particular LUN's out to requesting SHBA's and to audit all requests. To do this the service needs to be initialised with a set of HBA identities (as represented by the identities within the associated HSA). The identities could be directly specified (say by public key certificates) or by the identity of a CA whose sole purpose is to certify the secured HBA interfaces.
Adding a new segment
A command to create a new segment (zone or LUN) will specify who manages the policies and the deployment policies. The secret will be created as part of the command and of course, the request will be audited. The key manager service secures the usage of these policies and the associated secrets; the policies remain within the memory and be stored in a secured form on the host system to be reloaded on a reboot. The secrets are stored in internal memory (flash or battery backed up) ensuring they do not leak out side of the system; a hash of the associated policies is stored with the key such that on reboot the key manager will only accept the current policies associated with each key.
Richness of Policies
For the key management service there will likely be management policies detailing which hosts can access which segments or who can authorise those configurations. The form that these policies take depends on the fluidity of the system configuration -in a simple wired rack system policies would refer directly to machines, whereas in a utility data centre (UDC) type of environment [14] , where machines could be constantly being redeployed, the policies would need to support reconfiguration messages from the administrators. In these cases, the policies may have certain constraints such as limiting the number or type of machines accessing a zone at any point in time -in accordance with the customer contracts.
The Key Manager Service
To allow the standard PKI based authentication and encrypted communications the HSA has a PKI based identity. It also contains a "trust list", i.e. a list of public keys (or certificates) together with what the proven owners of the certificates can be trusted for; for example, most of the administrator roles, and perhaps external third parties or administrators of hosted applications. This allows signatures on policy changes or supporting reconfiguration messages to be verified.
A bonus of grounding the trust in hardware is that details of these changes can be trustably captured and sent to an audit system or securely logged on the host system ensuring that the administrators are held to account. All commands associated to setting and changing policies need to be securely audited in such a way as to keep the authorising administrators accountable. As such all the commands are required to have the appropriate signature; or set of signatures where several authorisations are required. All management requests (included those rejected requests) will be added into a trusted audit system allowing all actions to be traced. This audit system could be a separate system or the key manager could add elements to an audit log where it signs each new audit element along with the hash of the previous audit element. This would ensure that the continuity of the audit information can be checked.
The key management discussion has so far concerned the management of key distribution policies these are there to control the distribution of the encryption keys to various SHBAs. On booting or a re-configuration, the SHBA will contact the key manager to obtain the base secrets allowing access to the SAN data. As with the management commands the request for keys for particular zones or LUNs is to be signed using the identity of the SHBA. This key manager will validate the request and look at the policies associated with each of the requested zones assessing whether that SHBA is allowed to access the keys. A package is then formed containing these decisions along with the secrets and potentially any usage restrictions on these keys (for example read only).
There are obvious issues concerning the freshness of such commands and the initial interaction in setting a configuration, policy change or a key request gets a nonce to be included in the signed messages. The key manager service keeps this nonce for a set time and the response must come within this time otherwise it will be rejected. In addition, the SHBA should be concerned with the freshness of the response package it received and it will include a nonce in its request that must be included in the response package. The response package is mainly encrypted but should also be wrapped with a signed structure containing the hash of the encrypted package and the SHBAs nonce so that the source and freshness of the reply can quickly be checked.
The response package is encrypted using the SHBAs public key and returned. The original request along with the list of decisions and usage restrictions is then sent to the audit system such that there is a secure trace of which machines have access to which keys and the conditions that they are operating under.
Escrow and Duplication
The discussion concerning the key manager has described a single service that is mainly contained within a single hardware security appliance with some additional storage and audit capabilities provided by a host system. The SAN fabric needs to provide a resilient storage infrastructure and it cannot be at the mercy of a single key manager; particularly one that is designed to shut down if it detects intrusions. It is therefore essential to duplicate the functions of the key manager device leading to two main issues: firstly, ensuring that the keys survive and can be transferred between devices and secondly, ensuring that control commands are propagated to each device.
The survivability of the secrets within the zones is an essential feature of any key management system encrypting anything more than transitory data. As well as allowing the transfer of the secrets into the HBA the policies can also allow the transfer of keys (along with the associated policy constraints) to other key manager services. Such policies could be set up at the base service level creating a ring of key managers each with the same secrets and each of which can be used by any of the SHBAs; this is probably the simplest method particularly with a re-configurable infrastructure. Control could instead be placed at the zone policy level creating a tighter separation of data but it is fraught with dangers where policies do not adequately back up the keys.
Key escrow policies could be more naturally associated directly to the zone level policies although there could be default service level policies where more fine-grained escrow is not defined. Escrow policies could specify which stores or individuals get shares of the secret or sets of shares using secret sharing algorithms [10] and this can ensure that the owner of the data (or a third party they trust) is needed to recover the keys.
The second aspect concerned with running multiple devices is ensuring that all the configurations are synchronised. A simple solution would be for the configuration messages to be sent to all of the key managers. Alternatively, the key managers should be configured to know about each other (as with the key distribution) and on receiving a configuration message this should be propagated to the other system. Heartbeats between the systems can ensure that their configurations are the same or inconsistencies can then be resolved.
The SHBA also needs initialisation both to give it an initial identity and to ensure it knows about all the key managers. Each SHBA has a list of key managers which it would try, in some order, to gain keys on start updefining different orders for each SHBA allows the load to be spread over several key manager systems. Part of the initialisation and allocation of identity for an SHBA involves allocating a manager, or a number of managers, that can reconfigure this management information. As with the key manager, configuration messages must be written into audit logs which each SHBA can secure using its identity.
HSA devices
The key management system that has been described contains two types of hardware security appliances each of which has very different functionality and as such there is a brief description of the expectations for each device. Processes surrounding the identity of devices are also discussed.
Key Manager Service
The key manager service or set of services is the key element ensuring that the encryption keys are secured and only ever exist within a secured environment. The bulk of the key manager service runs on a secured hardware device that is placed in, or linked to, a host machine controlling the communications and provides storage and logging capabilities. The key managers main role is to tightly associate management of the encryption keys with policies specifying which systems can access the keys.
The hardware security appliance is assumed to contain the usual cryptography functionality that would exist within a HSM, some general processing capabilities (cpu and memory), a protected clock and some non-volatile store used to store keys and secrets. The appliance device requires active protection measures such as those described in the FIPS-140 level 4 standard [5] such that attempts to gain the secrets or interfere with the operations within the secured device will produce an appropriate response such as wiping secrets from the non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory (flash or battery backed up) need not be large as this is not the main store. Policies and audit data are stored on the host system with just enough data being stored within the HSA to ensure the integrity of this data.
Using the HSA model, a (relatively) simple device is given an identity certified at manufacture identifying the individual device, its type, security characteristics and who manufactured it. The key management service is then downloaded and certified based on the certification of the original hardware device. The device has a simple loader allowing this to happen rather than a complex OS containing bugs and vulnerabilities. This results in a key manager service running in a simple, protected and wellknown environment. The security of the overall key distribution and encryption system is built on this trust chain rooted in the secure hardware.
The key manager service has few basic operations concerning accepting management commands, securely looking after keys, checking policies, packaging keys for distribution and producing audit logs. The protected hardware ensures not only that the keys are protected but also strongly binds accesses to those keys with the policy enforcement and audit messages.
Secured Host Bus Adaptor (SHBA)
The key manager could be built on a general secure co-processor device that has sufficient processing capacity for policy validation. The SHBA is a standard HBA that also contains a trusted component that has all data routed through it. This trusted component needs to have fast symmetric encryption capabilities allowing for a high data throughput as well as fast key generation and key caching. This device is far more specialist and rather than having the relatively large form factor associated with a secure co-processor with active protection it could take the form of a security chip similar to a TCPA devices [7] . This type of specialist device may just conform to the HSA model in that it could be built for a specific purpose. Ideally, it would be a device that can be applied in a range of situations, eg general encrypted storage systems, as this will allow volume production thereby driving cost reduction ensuing HSA security solutions can be made affordable. Additional capabilities for policy enforcement within the HSA device can be used to extend the control taking other system factors into account as discussed in section 5.
Device Identity
A key aspect of the HSA lifecycle for the discussion on SAN security is in the generation of an identity of each device. As the service is downloaded or configured a public, private key pair is generated within the HSA; this forms the basis of the device identity. The device can then generate a certificate request allowing the appropriate authority to identify the service running on the devicethis identity is of course based not only on the key pair but also on the original certification of the HSA hardware. Once the component services are given identities as particular services running within the HSA systems other services can judge this trust chain and communicate with them.
Discussion
This section has described a system for encrypting data and managing the encrypted keys within a SAN system. The security of this system is rooted in the use of hardware security appliances that secure keys as well as ensuring that they are correctly used. The components of the system ensure that the encryption keys are distributed according to the policies defined by administrators. The combination of tight key management, policy enforcement along with the strong audit ensures that there are no systemic backdoors and that administrators opening up backdoors in their policy configurations can be held to account.
The use of an HSA and key management service opens up possibilities of multi-domain administration. The key manager can be set up to allow changes in policies for a particular zone to be authorised only by external administrators which helps support a hosting model; policies can even be set up to require two sets of administrators to authorise changes. Such a model supports a hosting environment where machines within a data centre are allocated to an entity along with a number SAN zones and access within this can then be managed by the hosted entity.
Much of the research described here has concentrated on the use of hardware security appliances and how they can be applied to securely managing keys within an encrypted SAN infrastructure. Possibilities for extending the key management are discussed in the next section. Efficiency concerns surrounding the encryption and the key schedules have not been fully explored although it is believed that these represent sensible tradeoffs when it is considered necessary to encrypt data on a SAN network. Using this approach, it is of course possible to specify some zones or LUNS that require encryption whilst keeping others open.
Extending the model
There are two areas where the key management model could be extended: more fine-grained control on the encryption could be introduced and the release of keys could be integrated more tightly into other security mechanisms.
The release of keys to a SHBA makes certain assumptions about the machines that this adaptor is linked into and equally concerning the users of these machines. The SHBA could perform some checks concerning the integrity of the systems it is communicating and depending on the OS the processes or users that are able to access the device. For example, if the systems were to be connected to a TCPA compliant system then there could be a protocol allowing the integrity of the system to be reported to the SHBA and therefore to the key manager to be used in decisions on releasing or using keys. Given a system whose integrity can be checked, further validation of OS level properties and configurations could be performed bring a more systemic view of security to the key manager.
The approach to encrypting data described earlier has a secret per zone or LUN used to generate block level encryption keys. Typically, the zone level keys would be distributed however, access could occasionally be granted at a block level having the key manager calculate the keys for a particular block. More hierarchy could be introduced into the key generation schedules dividing the zones into finer blocks whose access could be further controlled. Although there are advantages to doing this it complicates the usage of storage devices since there is not a direct link between the applications and data stored on particular blocks and the management of the encryption keys.
Another area where further control can be placed accessibility of the data, as has already been hinted at, is to associate policies with the secrets that restrict their usage at the SHBA level as well as in the key management service. Such policies could include read only policies or limit access to certain blocks, put time outs on the key usage. Having such policies also opens up the possibilities of having stronger authentication between the key usage and the systems connected to the SHBA although this would require additional protocols and be reliant on the integrity of the connected systems.
Discussion
The key management solution demonstrates the high level of control that can be achieved using trusted hardware to ground the security. Hardware has been used to provide a safe environment for applications to run [12] and it has also been shown how a trusted processor module [7] can be used to ground trust in the integrity of devices. The HSA approach provides a mechanism for grounding simple security services that can be used to secure an overall application such as ESKAPE described in section 3 and to secure storage infrastructures such as SANs.
These two applications demonstrate the strength of the HSA approach to a range of low and high level storage applications and it is believed that the approach can be applied in other applications. The approach becomes powerful when considering the total cost of ownership of the various solutions using HSAs in securely meeting management requirements as compared to the procedures, staff checks and other security mechanisms that would otherwise need to be in place. For such approaches to become compelling the cost of secure hardware appliance devices must be reduced but this should be possible as such devices can be used in large range of different applications.
The approach to managing encryption keys within a SAN system allows some of the obvious advantages that are gained from the encryption of data on a SAN system; i.e. protecting data from leakage both whist on the disks and whilst in transit. This key management solution allows automatic data encryption to be added with a relatively light management overhead although this is traded off against the cost of the secure hardware. The approach is not intended to replace the traditional SAN security provided by hard or soft zoning or LUN mapping instead when working in concert with these mechanisms it provides further necessary security properties. It also provides a strong trail of evidence when a computing fabric is hosting other systems in that it strongly audits access to data and provides a mechanism for devolving control or sharing it with the hosted entities.
This work has concentrated on the key management and distribution aspects of the solution leaving issues surrounding the form that the HSAs will take. This is particularly the case with the SHBA that is critical in keeping a high throughput both from the raw encryption and the key finding and generation aspects. The key management system as it stands helps keep the data encrypted but does not protect the raw disk segments or validate the integrity of the data. Further research may lead to solutions that can assess the integrity of the data although this would probably be at the expense of storage capacity. It may also be possible to combine this approach with the storage level security such that the SHBA authorises data access and most importantly writes.
Conclusion
This paper proposes the use of hardware security appliances that build on the security of cryptographic keys and functions provided by HSMs by combining this functionality with operations controlling the key usage. In this way, simple services provide strong security properties that are rooted in the secure hardware.
The approach has been applied to keeping encrypted data and more specifically to encrypting data in a SAN system. Although encrypted data is the desired outcome most of the security problems are associated with securely managing the keys, controlling their distribution and usage policies. The HSA approach described here shows how this can be achieved whilst also providing a strong audit trail to stop administrators maliciously configuring the system. The SAN encryption system demonstrates some of the strong security properties that can be achieved using the HSA approach at least for storage applications.
